Iran’s nuclear ambitions have taken a significant leap forward, with the country informing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intention to install more than 6,000 additional uranium-enriching centrifuges. This alarming development, revealed in a confidential IAEA report obtained by Reuters, represents a clear escalation of tensions and raises serious concerns about the potential for nuclear proliferation.
The IAEA report meticulously details Iran’s response to a recent resolution passed by the agency’s Board of Governors. This resolution, backed by the US, UK, France, and Germany, condemned Iran’s nuclear activities. In retaliation, Iran announced plans to significantly expand its enrichment capacity, directly contradicting international efforts to curb its nuclear program. The increased enrichment capability allows Iran to produce enriched uranium at a much faster rate, thereby heightening the risk of nuclear weapons development.
While Iran steadfastly maintains its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, Western powers remain unconvinced. The enrichment of uranium to 60% purity – a level nearing the 90% required for weapons-grade material – is unprecedented outside the context of nuclear weapons development. No other nation has achieved this level of enrichment without producing a nuclear weapon. This lack of a credible civilian explanation fuels international skepticism and concern.
The report further specifies that the new centrifuges will initially enrich uranium to 5% purity. This seemingly lower enrichment level, particularly at the Fordow enrichment plant (a deeply buried facility), could be interpreted as a conciliatory gesture aimed at finding common ground with European powers before the anticipated return of a more hawkish US administration under President-elect Donald Trump. However, the ease with which enrichment levels can be subsequently adjusted underscores the inherent instability of the situation.
Iran already operates well over 10,000 centrifuges at its Natanz and Fordow facilities. The IAEA report highlights the planned installation of 32 additional cascades (clusters) of over 160 centrifuges each, plus a massive cascade of up to 1,152 advanced IR-6 machines. Importantly, the number of planned new cascades far exceeds those currently operational, and although Iran has said it will bring existing cascades online, the IAEA confirms that Iran has yet to provide the necessary uranium feedstock for these machines.
The IAEA’s report acknowledges its increased inspection activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) following the commissioning of eight recently installed IR-6 cascades, underlining the heightened scrutiny on Iran’s activities at this highly sensitive underground facility where uranium is enriched to 60%. The only other location performing enrichment at this level is the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.
Prior to the IAEA board meeting, Iran offered a temporary cap on its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium. However, this offer was contingent upon the board not passing a resolution against Iran. Despite the IAEA’s verification of a slowdown in 60% enrichment, which the agency called a “concrete step in the right direction,” the board proceeded with the resolution, reiterating its call for improved cooperation with the IAEA. This sequence of events underscores the complex and high-stakes nature of ongoing diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program.
