The Biju Janata Dal (BJD), after holding power in Odisha for nearly a quarter-century, experienced a crushing defeat in the recent Assembly and Lok Sabha elections, losing to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This marks the BJD’s worst performance since its inception, attributed to a confluence of factors that go beyond the BJP’s winning strategy. The BJD’s downfall is deeply rooted in its internal functioning and strategic missteps in recent years.
One key reason for the BJD’s unacceptability among voters was the party’s bureaucratic hubris. The BJD functioned more like a corporate entity, with bureaucrats holding positions of senior managers. Elected representatives were marginalized, with district administrators wielding more power than local leaders. The governance feedback mechanism was heavily reliant on local officers, diminishing the popularity of BJD leaders as they became dependent on the bureaucrats’ favor. In rural areas, the surge in perceived grievances due to administrative ineffectiveness fueled the narrative of ‘paribartan’ (change). The everyday lives of people in these belts were significantly impacted by the functioning of local block offices and police stations. Despite the introduction of pro-people initiatives, these grievance redress centers were perceived as hubs of corruption, a stark contrast to the BJD’s initial intentions.
Organizational failure further exacerbated the BJD’s predicament. The lack of a mechanism to address internal party conflicts and accommodate the growing number of aspirants led to many BJD loyalists switching sides at the last moment. Disgruntled cadres in many areas were waiting for an opportunity to punish the party for issues such as faulty candidate selection and unmet demands. The top leadership remained complacent, relying heavily on the popularity of party chief Naveen Patnaik and failing to recognize the brewing tensions on the ground. The BJD’s organizational secretary contesting a new Lok Sabha seat against the Union Education Minister, abandoning his home district (a BJD stronghold), epitomized the party’s unimpressive electioneering. The party not only lost that seat but also suffered a significant blow in one of its strongholds. The party’s heavy reliance on the bureaucratic structure was exposed when the Election Commission took action against key officers, disrupting the party’s functioning. The overt centralisation within the party also hindered local leaders from countering opponents’ tactics without permission from the top.
The BJD operates under the assumption that voters have short memories. This approach influenced their ticket distribution strategy and the announcement of populist schemes. The party chose to field tainted leaders or their relatives, assuming voters had forgotten past transgressions. Furthermore, the party was the last to release its manifesto, and some of their popular promises, such as free electricity or pensions for self-help group members, were not effectively disseminated. The party waited until the last moment, just before the enforcement of the model code of conduct, to announce some of their popular measures.
The BJD’s ideological bankruptcy also proved detrimental. The party broke its alliance with the BJP in 2009, citing its secular stance, but supported almost all Bills introduced by the BJP-led government in the following years. The fact that Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw was nominated to the Upper House by the BJD reveals the party’s confused ideology. Vaishnaw returned to Odisha to campaign against the BJD just months after his nomination, leaving many voters bewildered by the political maneuvering between the BJP and BJD. The BJD cadre lacked strong motivation to counter the BJP’s campaign.
The BJD, known for its consistent electoral victories, faced a significant setback this time. However, the popularity of Naveen Patnaik remains intact. If the party aims to revive, its primary goal should be to establish itself as a strong political opponent to the BJP.
