Over the last three decades, there’s been a consistent erosion in the political fortunes of parties aligning with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). A discernible transfer of dividends to the BJP has been evident, while those who provided support have faced losses. This article delves into the historical one-way traffic of this political relationship.
Let’s examine the status of two of the BJP’s earliest alliance partners – the Shiv Sena (SS) in Maharashtra and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab. The Sena, with 15 Lok Sabha seats, and the SAD, with eight, were the sole supporters of the BJP when it claimed the formation of the government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s leadership in 1996. Despite ruling for 13 days, the BJP failed to attract new political alliances, leading to the formation of the United Front government led by H.D. Deve Gowda.
The Sena and the BJP joined forces during the 1984 Lok Sabha election. This alliance solidified on the Hindutva fulcrum in 1989. The demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the devastating Mumbai riots of 1992-93 paved the way for the first Sena-BJP government in Maharashtra in 1995, with Manohar Joshi of the Sena as Chief Minister. The accepted formula was that the Sena would hold sway in Maharashtra, while the BJP would determine the national political trajectory. However, the BJP’s ambitions grew. It discarded this equation and demanded more seats for itself in the 2014 Assembly elections. When the Sena refused to relinquish its primacy in the state, the alliance dissolved. The BJP formed the government in Maharashtra, with Devendra Fadnavis as Chief Minister, accelerating the downward trend for the Sena. When the Sena managed to gain power by forming a post-poll alliance with the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and the Indian National Congress in 2019, the BJP ensured a split within both regional parties, namely the NCP and the Sena, and their symbols were frozen. This act, popularly termed ‘Operation Lotus’ by television channels, effectively represented the one-way shift of strengths from other parties to the BJP.
The SAD had been a member of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance since 1996. The alliance came to power in Punjab in 2007, achieving a historic feat in 2012 by securing a consecutive term despite facing anti-incumbency. However, the SAD, which prides itself on representing farmers, was not consulted by the BJP before introducing the controversial farm laws. The alliance broke in 2020, and in the 2022 State Assembly elections, the SAD secured just three seats in a legislature of 117, paving the way for the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) to form the government. To revive its fortunes, the SAD decided to contest the 2024 Lok Sabha elections independently and won one seat. This ill-fated alliance with the BJP forced the SAD to concede political space to the new entrant AAP, and also contributed to the Congress’s political revival.
The story of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) is illustrative. This Assam party has been engaged in an on-and-off alliance with the BJP since 2001. The AGP witnessed one of its prominent leaders, Sarbananda Sonowal, being absorbed into the BJP and appointed as Chief Minister. He is now part of the BJP-led NDA’s Union Cabinet. While the AGP was the dominant force when the alliance was established, the BJP has become the key player within two decades. In the recent Lok Sabha election, the BJP secured nine seats while the AGP won just one, out of the 14 seats in Assam.
The case of other regional parties This story has regional variations when it comes to the fortune of four other regional political parties: the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), YSR Congress Party (YSRCP), the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS), and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagam (AIADMK). These parties provided crucial numerical support to the BJP in its pursuit of implementing several laws perceived as partisan. Most of these Bills undermined the federal balance. It’s crucial to remember that the BJP could pass many Bills in Lok Sabha due to its own majority. However, these regional parties played a key role in passing the Bills in the Rajya Sabha, where the BJP lacked sufficient numbers. What is the current status of these parties? How did the BJP treat them? Except for the Janata Dal (United), or JD(U), which has mastered the art of navigating this complex political landscape, all others have become inconsequential. In Odisha, the BJP won 20 out of 21 seats, while the BJD has no representation. In Telangana, the BJP secured eight seats out of 17, while the BRS secured none. In Andhra Pradesh, the BJP-led NDA (Telugu Desam Party 16, BJP 3, and the Janasena Party, 2) won 21 seats, reducing the YSRCP to just four seats. In Tamil Nadu, the AIADMK is fragmented into three factions. While the Edappadi K. Palaniswami faction holds official recognition and the poll symbol, the other two factions led by O. Panneerselvam and T.T.V. Dhinakaran pose a significant challenge to the official AIADMK faction in southern Tamil Nadu. Despite their unwavering support for the BJP’s centralisation drive through hasty legislative measures in Parliament, all three factions have drawn a blank. The BJD, the BRS, the YSRCP, and the AIADMK have lost their respective states in the process.
The fate of the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) paints a poignant picture. They shared power with the BJP just months before the significant dilution of Article 370. Now they have no representation in Parliament.
It is clear that the BJP capitalizes on the strengths of its allies while transferring its weaknesses onto them. Their embrace is often perceived as a fatal one. This raises a significant question: can the JD(U) and the TDP now escape this deadly embrace?
A.S. Panneerselvan is a fellow of the Roja Muthiah Research Library, Chennai
