Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent expression of a desire to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has sent shockwaves through the region. This development is particularly noteworthy given Erdogan’s long-standing stance of labelling Assad a “terrorist” and his unwavering support for efforts to remove him from power. This abrupt shift in policy raises crucial questions about the underlying factors compelling Erdogan to seek rapprochement with a leader he once vehemently opposed.
The Syrian civil war, now entering its second decade, has profoundly impacted Turkey, both domestically and strategically. Initially, Turkey played a pivotal role in supporting the Syrian opposition, providing logistical assistance and facilitating the movement of fighters into Syria through the notorious “Jihadi Highway”. This active involvement aimed to expedite Assad’s downfall, aligning with Turkey’s broader regional ambitions. However, this intervention had unintended and far-reaching consequences.
Millions of Syrians fled the escalating conflict, seeking refuge in neighboring Turkey. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 3.7 million Syrian refugees, placing a significant strain on the country’s resources and exacerbating societal tensions. Despite receiving substantial financial aid from the European Union and the United States, the presence of such a massive refugee population has become a contentious issue within Turkey, fueling public discontent and mounting political pressure on the government.
The refugee crisis has become a defining issue in Turkish domestic politics. Anti-Syrian sentiments have been on the rise, with recent riots in various Turkish cities highlighting the growing friction between refugees and local populations. The economic pressures brought on by high inflation have further intensified these tensions, with many Turks blaming Syrian refugees for their economic woes. This growing public frustration has become a major political concern for Erdogan. Opposition parties have effectively capitalized on this discontent, advocating for mass deportations and criticizing the government’s handling of the refugee situation. This mounting pressure has forced Erdogan to reconsider his approach, leading to his outreach to Assad in hopes of finding a solution that could facilitate the return of refugees to Syria.
Another critical factor driving Erdogan’s outreach is the situation in northeast Syria, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have established a semi-autonomous region with apparent American support. Turkey views the presence of an autonomous Kurdish entity on its border as a direct threat to its national security, fearing it could inspire separatist sentiments among its own Kurdish population. This fear stems from Turkey’s long-standing struggle with Kurdish separatism within its own borders. Despite launching military operations, such as Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Peace Spring, to disrupt the territorial integrity of Kurdish-controlled areas, the Kurdish presence remains a significant concern for Ankara.
Erdogan sees engagement with Assad as a potential means to counterbalance Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, hoping that a cooperative Syria might clamp down on Kurdish forces. By aligning with Assad, Turkey could potentially leverage his influence to weaken the SDF, thereby addressing its security concerns.
From Assad’s perspective, engaging with Erdogan offers an opportunity to reclaim Syrian control over areas occupied by rebels and foreign forces. Although Assad insists on Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory as a precondition for any meeting, he has shown openness to dialogue, recognizing the potential benefits of normalizing relations with Turkey. The restoration of trade and economic ties with Turkey could provide a much-needed boost to Syria’s ailing economy. Moreover, Assad hopes to leverage Turkey’s stance against the Kurds to his advantage, potentially negotiating a deal with Syrian Kurds that aligns with Damascus’s interests. However, Assad is adamant that any such arrangement must involve the dissolution of Kurdish military structures, a stipulation the Kurds are unlikely to accept as long as they enjoy American backing.
Erdogan’s outreach to Assad also has significant strategic implications for the US, which has a substantial military presence in the region. The United States’ current strategy, which involves a small military presence in Syria to support the SDF and counter Iranian influence, is becoming increasingly untenable. With regional actors normalizing relations with Damascus, Washington’s goal of regime change in Syria appears increasingly unrealistic. The election of Iranian reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, who has shown willingness to engage with the West, further complicates the situation.
As the US heads towards elections that will determine its approach towards Iran, the current Joe Biden administration must reconsider its position on Syria. The long-standing policy of regime change and the creation of a quasi-independent Kurdish enclave in Syria may no longer align with the evolving geopolitical landscape and the changing alignment in West Asia.
For the US, the most pragmatic approach may involve facilitating a diplomatic resolution between the SDF and the Syrian government, ensuring Kurdish rights while reestablishing Syrian sovereignty. This could involve easing sanctions on Syria to stimulate economic recovery and encourage the return of refugees, thereby reducing regional tensions and stabilizing the situation. Furthermore, the US may need to acknowledge the shifting dynamics among its allies. Many European countries, as well as Turkey, are advocating for the normalization of relations with Assad. By resisting this trend, the US may alienate its allies and lose influence in the region, especially as Europe expresses unease with the possibility of Donald Trump’s return to power as the American president this November.
Erdogan’s overture to Assad underscores the complex and evolving nature of West Asian geopolitics. Driven by domestic pressures, security concerns, and regional realignments, Turkey’s shift in policy reflects more the need for pragmatic engagement with Syria than a genuine interest in resolving the Syrian (and hence also the Turkish) crisis. As the situation unfolds, it remains to be seen how these diplomatic efforts reshape the region’s political landscape and influence the broader international response to the enduring conflict in Syria.
