Amidst ongoing scrutiny of risky viral research conducted in China following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, recently released documents have brought to light even more concerning issues surrounding safety and transparency. These documents, consisting of over 2,800 pages of communication between the New York-based non-governmental organization EcoHealth Alliance and the US government-funded One Health Institute at the University of California, Davis (UC-Davis), expose discussions between researchers about pathogen research conducted across the globe, including in China, and the funding allocated for such endeavors. The emails reveal that this research was being undertaken without adequate safeguards and oversight, fueling concerns about the potential risks associated with these projects.
The EcoHealth Alliance, which has been at the heart of investigations into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid-19, has a history of collaborating with Chinese researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) to conduct ‘gain-of-function’ (GoF) research on coronaviruses. This type of research, which involves modifying viruses to enhance their characteristics, such as transmissibility or severity, has been a major point of suspicion in the ongoing debate over whether a lab accident may have triggered the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, which subsequently spread worldwide, leading to the pandemic. These documents, obtained through the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and publicly published by US Right to Know, a health-focused investigative news organization, offer crucial insight into the practices and oversight surrounding this research.
The One Health Institute at UC Davis was responsible for managing the federal ‘PREDICT’ program (Emerging Pandemic Threats program), which aimed to strengthen global capacity to detect and discover zoonotic viruses, those that can jump from animals to humans. Between 2014 and 2019, the program managed a federal budget of $100 million, distributing grants to various institutions, including the EcoHealth Alliance, which further channeled these funds to researchers overseas, including the WIV in China. While the stated objective of the PREDICT program was to bolster global disease surveillance and diagnostic capabilities for both known and newly discovered viruses, the program has come under fire for funding researchers who handled viruses with questionable practices.
In an email dated August 1, 2019, Corina Grigorescu Monagin, a One Health Project Scientist, wrote to Ava Sullivan, the PREDICT coordinator in India, expressing concerns about the safety and nature of research being conducted in China, India, Southeast Asia, and Africa, as well as the handling and return of collected samples. This communication raises serious questions about transparency and oversight as it reveals that Monagin, who led the Global Monitoring and Evaluation efforts at PREDICT, was seemingly unaware of the details of the research being funded by her own institute and the methods used for managing virus samples.
Specifically, Monagin inquires about who would be handling samples at the Guangdong Centers for Disease Control (GDCDC) in China and whether any samples had been collected in the Yunnan province. She also requests information about the process for returning samples from China, India, Liberia, and Congo. These questions suggest that Monagin was unaware of the specifics of the viral research being conducted with PREDICT funding, highlighting potential gaps in transparency. Furthermore, Monagin expressed serious concerns about the safety of the laboratory in Congo. In her email, she questioned the security and power supply at the Laboratoire National de Santé Publique in Brazzaville, wondering if the facility had a secure environment for storing samples and whether back-up generators were available. Her inquiries underscore a lack of basic information about the facilities where samples from the funded research were being kept, raising significant concerns about biosafety protocols.
In response to these revelations, Emily Kopp of US RTK tweeted, “It shows EcoHealth Alliance may have left novel viruses in the freezers of other countries. That may explain why the U.S. underwrote the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s coronavirus hunting expeditions, yet cannot reach a conclusion about whether the lab had a progenitor to Covid.” These concerns highlight the potential for mishandling and accidental release of dangerous viruses due to inadequate safety measures and oversight.
While the US Department of State, which funds US AID, which in turn funded PREDICT at UC Davis, halted all grants to China and India, the flow of funds from the United States to China remained extensive through other channels, as evidenced by documents released under the FOIA and Congressional reports. This suggests a broader network of funding pathways that allowed money to reach China despite the official suspension of direct grants. For example, in November 2019, Professor Xiangming Xiao from the University of Oklahoma secured a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to “study avian influenza viruses in China.” This grant, along with others, demonstrates that even as the Department of State, led by Mike Pompeo, took a hard stance against China, US government funding continued to reach Chinese institutions through alternative routes, indicating a complex and interconnected system of funding.
The widespread nature of these funding linkages was further revealed in a 2023 GAO audit of US funding to Chinese institutions. This audit underscores the need for greater transparency and accountability in international research collaborations to ensure that funds are used responsibly and effectively, particularly when dealing with sensitive research involving potentially dangerous pathogens. The audit also raised concerns about the effectiveness of US oversight mechanisms in monitoring and regulating GoF research, especially given the limitations in tracking sub-awards below a certain threshold.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in Wuhan, China, has been at the forefront of research on viruses, including coronaviruses, and GoF research. GoF research involves modifying an organism to give it characteristics it would not naturally possess. In the context of viral research, this means altering a virus to make it more transmissible, severe, or capable of infecting organisms it would not typically infect. The WIV, led by Shi Zhengli, a prominent figure in coronavirus research, has conducted extensive GoF research on coronaviruses, raising concerns about the potential risks involved. The research conducted at the WIV and other Chinese institutions was funded in part by US government funds, with the EcoHealth Alliance playing a central role in distributing these funds.
The GAO discovered that the WIV, Wuhan University, and the Academy of Military Medical Sciences received over $2 million in US government funds between 2014 and 2021. However, the GAO noted that the actual amount could be significantly higher because reporting requirements for sub-awards below $30,000 and those beyond the first tier are not mandatory, leaving potential gaps in the accounting for these funds. This lack of transparency raises serious concerns about the extent of US government funding for GoF research in China and the potential for oversight gaps.
The GAO report also highlighted the US government’s inability to fully enforce a ban on GoF research funding during a three-year period, despite its implementation in 2014 by the Obama administration. While the ban was lifted in 2017 by the Trump administration, the GAO found that even during the period of the ban, the US government lacked the necessary mechanisms to effectively control the flow of funds. The report further revealed that while grants awarded before the 2014 ban could be used for GoF research, subsequent grants awarded in 2016 included conditions requiring the EcoHealth Alliance and the WIV to cease experiments with specific viruses and provide relevant data to the NIH if the bat coronaviruses being studied at the WIV exhibited increased viral growth above a certain threshold. These conditions aimed to mitigate the risks associated with GoF research. However, in 2021, the NIH concluded that the EcoHealth Alliance had violated these conditions and requested unpublished data from experiments at the WIV, which was not provided. This lack of transparency and compliance ultimately led to the suspension of the grants by the NIH due to “material noncompliance.” This incident raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the US government’s ability to monitor and enforce safety regulations related to GoF research.
Nearly five years after the Covid-19 outbreak in China, the origin of the virus remains unclear. Although the World Health Organization (WHO) initially suggested that the SARS-CoV-2 likely originated from a bat, no definitive animal source has been identified. Meanwhile, the hypothesis that the virus could have leaked from a lab has gained traction due to the fact that the WIV, located near the site of the first reported outbreak, was engaged in GoF research on coronaviruses for years prior to the initial outbreak in Wuhan. Furthermore, evidence has emerged indicating that prominent US scientists and the EcoHealth Alliance were collaborating with WIV researchers on this risky research. Reports by the US Department of State and the intelligence community have revealed that scientists connected to the GoF research at the WIV fell ill with Covid-like symptoms just before the outbreak was reported in November 2019. A 2022 report by the US Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) also documented a series of biosafety concerns at the WIV in the period leading up to the Covid-19 outbreak in 2019.
Given the mounting evidence, calls for a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the possibility of a lab leak at the Wuhan Institute of Virology as the source of the Covid-19 pandemic have intensified. This investigation should involve international collaboration and a transparent examination of all available data to shed light on the origins of the virus and address concerns about potential lapses in safety and oversight in the conduct of viral research.
